Temporal Logics for Hyperproperties by Clarkson, Michael R. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
1.
44
92
v2
  [
cs
.L
O]
  2
1 J
an
 20
14
Temporal Logics for Hyperproperties
Michael R. Clarkson1, Bernd Finkbeiner2, Masoud Koleini1,
Kristopher K. Micinski3, Markus N. Rabe2, and Ce´sar Sa´nchez4
1George Washington University; 2Universita¨t des Saarlandes;
3University of Maryland, College Park; 4IMDEA Software Institute
Abstract. Two new logics for verification of hyperproperties are pro-
posed. Hyperproperties characterize security policies, such as noninter-
ference, as a property of sets of computation paths. Standard temporal
logics such as LTL, CTL, and CTL∗ can refer only to a single path at a
time, hence cannot express many hyperproperties of interest. The logics
proposed here, HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗, add explicit and simultane-
ous quantification over multiple paths to LTL and to CTL∗. This kind of
quantification enables expression of hyperproperties. A model checking
algorithm for the proposed logics is given. For a fragment of HyperLTL,
a prototype model checker has been implemented.
1 Introduction
Trace properties, which developed out of an interest in proving the correctness of
programs [35], characterize correct behavior as properties of individual execution
traces. Although early verification techniques specialized in proving individual
correctness properties of interest, such as mutual exclusion or termination, tem-
poral logics soon emerged as a general, unifying framework for expressing and
verifying trace properties. Practical model checking tools [12, 18, 31] based on
those logics now enable automated verification of program correctness.
Verification of security is not directly possible with such tools, because some
important security policies cannot be characterized as properties of individual
execution traces [42]. Rather, they are properties of sets of execution traces,
also known as hyperproperties [16]. Specialized verification techniques have been
developed for particular hyperproperties [5, 30, 45, 47], as well as for 2-safety
properties [58], which are properties of pairs of execution traces. But a unifying
program logic for expressing and verifying hyperproperties could enable auto-
mated verification of a wide range of security policies.
In this paper, we propose two such logics. Both are based, like hyperproper-
ties, on examining more than one execution trace at a time. Our first logic,
HyperLTL, generalizes linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [48]. LTL implicitly
quantifies over only a single execution trace of a system, but HyperLTL allows
explicit quantification over multiple execution traces simultaneously, as well as
propositions that stipulate relationships among those traces. For example, Hy-
perLTL can express information-flow policies such as observational determin-
ism [41, 50, 68], which requires programs to behave as (deterministic) functions
2from low-security inputs to low-security outputs. The following two programs
do not satisfy observational determinism, because they leak the value of high-
security variable h through low-security variable l, thus making the program
behave nondeterministically from a low-security user’s perspective:
(1) l := h (2) if h = 0 then l := 1 else l := 0
Other program logics could already express observational determinism or closely
related policies [7,33,45]. Milushev and Clarke [44–46] have even proposed other
logics for hyperproperties, which we discuss in Section 8. But HyperLTL provides
a simple and unifying logic in which many information-flow security policies can
be directly expressed.
Information-flow policies are not one-size-fits-all. Different policies might be
needed depending on the power of the adversary. For example, the following
program does not satisfy observational determinism, but the program might be
acceptable if nondeterministic choices, denoted 8, are resolved such that the
probability distribution on output value l is uniform:
(3) l := h 8 l := 0 8 l := 1
On the other hand, if the adversary can influence the resolution of nondeter-
ministic choices, program (3) could be exploited to leak information. Similarly,
the following program does satisfy observational determinism, but the program
might be unacceptable if adversaries can monitor execution time:
(4) while h > 0 do {h := h− 1}
In Section 3, we show how policies appropriate for the above programs, as well
as other security policies, can be formalized in HyperLTL.
Our second logic, HyperCTL∗, generalizes a branching-time temporal logic,
CTL∗ [21]. Although CTL∗ already has explicit trace quantifiers, only one trace
is ever in scope at a given point in a formula (see Section 5.1), so CTL∗ cannot di-
rectly express hyperproperties. But HyperCTL∗ can, because it permits quantifi-
cation over multiple execution traces simultaneously. HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗
enjoy a similar relationship to that of LTL and CTL∗: HyperLTL is the syntac-
tic fragment of HyperCTL∗ containing only formulas in prenex form—that is,
formulas that begin exclusively with quantifiers and end with a quantifier-free
formula. HyperCTL∗ is thus a strict generalization of HyperLTL. HyperCTL∗
also generalizes a related temporal logic, SecLTL [20], and subsumes epistemic
temporal logic [22, 60] (see Section 5).
Having defined logics for hyperproperties, we investigate model checking of
those logics. In Section 6, we show that for HyperCTL∗ the model checking
problem is decidable by reducing it to the satisfiability problem for quantified
propositional temporal logic (QPTL) [56]. Since HyperCTL∗ generalizes Hyper-
LTL, we immediately obtain that the HyperLTL model checking problem is also
decidable. We present a hierarchy of fragments, which allows us to precisely char-
acterize the complexity of the model checking problem in the number quantifier
3alternations. The lowest fragment, which disallows any quantifier alternation,
can be checked by a space-efficient polynomial-time algorithm (NLOGSPACE
in the number of states of the program).
We also prototype a model checker that can handle an important fragment of
HyperLTL, including all the examples from Section 3. The prototype implements
a new model checking algorithm based on a well-known LTL algorithm [65, 66]
and on a self-composition construction [7, 58]. The complexity of our algorithm
is exponential in the size of the program and doubly exponential in the size of
the formula—impractical for real-world programs, but at least a demonstration
that model checking of hyperproperties formulated in our logic is possible.
This paper contributes to theoretical and foundational aspects of security by:
– defining two new program logics for expressing hyperproperties,
– demonstrating that those logics are expressive enough to formulate impor-
tant information-flow policies,
– proving that the model checking problem is decidable, and
– prototyping a new model checking algorithm and using it to verify security
policies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the syn-
tax and semantics of HyperLTL. Section 3 provides several example formula-
tions of information-flow policies. Section 4 defines the syntax and semantics of
HyperCTL∗. Section 5 compares our two logics with other temporal and epis-
temic logics. Section 6 obtains a model checking algorithm for HyperCTL∗. Sec-
tion 7 describes our prototype model checker. Section 8 reviews related work,
and Section 9 concludes.
2 HyperLTL
HyperLTL extends propositional linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [48] with ex-
plicit quantification over traces. A trace is an infinite sequence of sets of atomic
propositions. Let AP denote the set of all atomic propositions. The set TR of all
traces is therefore (2AP)ω .
We first define some notation for manipulating traces. Let t ∈ TR be a trace.
We use t[i] to denote element i of t, where i ∈ N. Hence, t[0] is the first element
of t. We write t[0, i] to denote the prefix of t up to and including element i, and
t[i,∞] to denote the infinite suffix of t beginning with element i.
Syntax. Let pi be a trace variable from an infinite supply V of trace variables.
Formulas of HyperLTL are defined by the following grammar:
ψ ::= ∃pi. ψ | ∀pi. ψ | ϕ
ϕ ::= api | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Xϕ | ϕ U ϕ
Connectives ∃ and ∀ are universal and existential trace quantifiers, read as “along
some traces” and “along all traces.” For example, ∀pi1. ∀pi2. ∃pi3. ψ means that
for all traces pi1 and pi2, there exists another trace pi3, such that ψ holds on those
three traces. (Since branching-time logics also have explicit path quantifiers, it
4is natural to wonder why one of them does not suffice to formulate hyperprop-
erties. Section 5.1 addresses that question.) A HyperLTL formula is closed if all
occurrences of trace variables are bound by a trace quantifier.
An atomic proposition a, where a ∈ AP, expresses some fact about states.
Since formulas may refer to multiple traces, we need to disambiguate which
trace the proposition refers to. So we annotate each occurrence of an atomic
proposition with a trace variable pi. Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ have the usual
classical meanings. Implication, conjunction, and bi-implication are defined as
syntactic sugar: ϕ1 → ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2), and
ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ1). True and false, written true and false, are
defined as api ∨ ¬api and ¬true.
Temporal connective Xϕ means that ϕ holds on the next state of every
quantified trace. Likewise, ϕ1 U ϕ2 means that ϕ2 will eventually hold of the
states of all quantified traces that appear at the same index, and until then ϕ1
holds. The other standard temporal connectives are defined as syntactic sugar:
Fϕ ≡ true U ϕ, and Gϕ ≡ ¬F¬ϕ, and ϕ1 Wϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1 U ϕ2) ∨ Gϕ1, and
ϕ1 R ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 U ¬ϕ2).
We also introduce syntactic sugar for comparing traces. Given a set P of
atomic propositions, pi[0]=P pi
′[0] ≡
∧
a∈P api↔api′ . That is, pi[0]=P pi
′[0] holds
whenever the first state in both pi and pi′ agree on all the propositions in P . And
pi=P pi
′ ≡ G(pi[0]=P pi′[0]), that is, all the positions of pi and pi′ agree on P . The
analogous definitions hold for 6=.
Semantics. The validity judgment for HyperLTL formulas is written Π |=T ψ,
where T is a set of traces, and Π : V → TR is a trace assignment (i.e., a
valuation), which is a partial function mapping trace variables to traces. Let
Π[pi 7→ t] denote the same function as Π, except that pi is mapped to t. We write
trace set T as a subscript on |=, because T propagates unchanged through the
semantics; we omit T when it is clear from context. Validity is defined as follows:
Π |=T ∃pi. ψ iff there exists t ∈ T : Π[pi 7→ t] |=T ψ
Π |=T ∀pi. ψ iff for all t ∈ T : Π[pi 7→ t] |=T ψ
Π |=T api iff a ∈ Π(pi)[0]
Π |=T ¬ϕ iff Π 6|=T ϕ
Π |=T ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff Π |=T ϕ1 or Π |=T ϕ2
Π |=T Xϕ iff Π[1,∞] |=T ϕ
Π |=T ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff there exists i ≥ 0 : Π[i,∞] |=T ϕ2
and for all 0 ≤ j < i we have Π[j,∞] |=T ϕ1
Trace assignment suffix Π[i,∞] denotes the trace assignment Π′(pi) = Π(pi)[i,∞]
for all pi. If Π |=T ϕ holds for the empty assignment Π, then T satisfies ϕ.
We are interested in whether programs satisfy formulas, so we first derive
a set T of traces from a program, first using Kripke structures as a unified
representation of programs. A Kripke structure K is a tuple (S, s0, δ,AP, L)
comprising a set of states S, an initial state s0 ∈ S, a transition function δ :
S → 2S, a set of atomic propositions AP, and a labeling function L : S → 2AP.
5To ensure that all traces are infinite, we require that δ(s) is nonempty for every
state s.
The set Traces(K) of traces of K is the set of all sequences of labels produced
by the state transitions of K starting from initial state. Formally, Traces(K)
contains trace t iff there exists a sequence s0s1 . . . of states, such that s0 is the
initial state, and for all i ≥ 0, it holds that si+1 ∈ δ(si); and t[i] = L(si). A
Kripke structure K satisfies ϕ, denoted by K |= ϕ, if Traces(K) satisfies ϕ.
It will later be technically convenient to consider enlarging the set AP of
atomic propositions permitted by a Kripke structure to a set AP′, such that
AP ⊂ AP′. We extend Traces(K) into the set of traces Traces(K,AP′) that is
agnostic about whether each new proposition holds at each state. A trace (P0 ∪
P ′0)(P1 ∪ P
′
1) . . . ∈ Traces(K,AP
′) whenever P0P1 . . . ∈ Traces(K), and for all
i ≥ 0: P ′i ⊆ AP
′ \ AP. The final conjunct requires every possible set of new
atomic propositions to be included in the traces.
3 Security Policies in HyperLTL
We now put HyperLTL into action by formulating several information-flow se-
curity policies, which stipulate how information may propagate from inputs to
outputs. Information-flow is a very active field in security; see [23,53] for surveys.
Noninterference. A program satisfies noninterference [26] when the outputs ob-
served by low-security users are the same as they would be in the absence of
inputs submitted by high-security users. Since its original definition, many vari-
ants with different execution models have been named “noninterference.” For
clarity of our examples, we choose a simple state-based synchronous execution
model in which atomic propositions of the traces contain the values of program
variables, and in which progress of time corresponds to execution steps in the
model. We also assume that the variables are partitioned into input and output
variables, and into two security levels, high and low. (We could handle lattices
of security levels by conjoining several formulas that stipulate noninterference
between elements of the lattice.)
Noninference [42] is a variant of noninterference that can be stated in our sim-
ple system model. Noninference stipulates that, for all traces, the low-observable
behavior must not change when all high inputs are replaced by a dummy input
λ, that is, when the high input is removed. Noninference, a liveness hyperprop-
erty [16], can be expressed in HyperLTL as follows:
∀pi.∃pi′. (Gλpi′) ∧ pi=Lpi
′ (5)
where λpi′ expresses that all of the high inputs in the current state of pi
′ are λ,
and pi=Lpi
′ expresses that all low variables in pi and pi′ have the same values.
Nondeterminism. Noninterference was introduced for use with deterministic pro-
grams. Nonetheless, nondeterminism naturally arises when program specifica-
tions abstract from implementation details, so many variants of noninterference
6have been developed for nondeterministic programs. We formalize two variants
here.
A (nondeterministic) program satisfies observational determinism [68] if ev-
ery pair of traces with the same initial low observation remain indistinguishable
for low users. That is, the program appears to be deterministic to low users.
Programs that satisfy observational determinism are immune to refinement at-
tacks [68], because observational determinism is preserved under refinement.
Observational determinism, a safety hyperproperty [16], can be expressed in Hy-
perLTL as follows:
∀pi.∀pi′. pi[0]=L,inpi
′[0] → pi=L,outpi
′ (6)
where pi=L,inpi
′ and pi=L,outpi
′ express that both traces agree on the low input
and low output variables, respectively.
Generalized noninterference (GNI) [39] permits nondeterminism in the low-
observable behavior, but stipulates that low-security outputs may not be altered
by the injection of high-security inputs. Like noninterference, GNI was original
formulated for event-based systems, but it can also be formulated for state-based
systems [42]. GNI is a liveness hyperproperty and can be expressed as follows:
∀pi.∀pi′.∃pi′′. pi=H,inpi
′′ ∧ pi′=Lpi
′′ (7)
The trace pi′′ in (7) is an interleaving of the high inputs of the first trace and
the low inputs and outputs of the second trace. Other security policies based
on interleavings, such as restrictiveness [40], separability [42], and forward cor-
rectability [43] can similarly be expressed in HyperLTL.
Declassification. Some programs need to reveal secret information to fulfill func-
tional requirements. For example, a password checker must reveal whether the
entered password is correct or not. The noninterference policies we have ex-
amined so far prohibit such behavior. More flexible security policies have been
designed to permit declassification of information; see [54] for a survey.
With HyperLTL, we easily specify customized declassification policies. For
example, suppose that a system inputs a password in its initial state, then de-
classifies whether that password is correct in the next state. The following policy
(a safety hyperproperty) stipulates that leaking the correctness of the password
is permitted, but that otherwise observational determinism must hold:
∀pi.∀pi′.(pi[0]=L,inpi
′[0] ∧ X(pwpi↔ pwpi′))→ pi=L,outpi
′ (8)
where atomic proposition pw expresses that the entered password is correct.
Quantitative noninterference. Quantitative information-flow policies [13, 15, 27,
34] permit leakage of information at restricted rates. One way to measure leak-
age is with min-entropy [57], which quantifies the amount of information an at-
tacker can gain given the answer to a single guess about the secret. The bounding
problem [67] for min-entropy is to determine whether that amount is bounded
7from above by a constant n. Assume that the program whose leakage is being
quantified is deterministic, and assume that the secret input to that program is
uniformly distributed. The bounding problem then reduces to determining that
there is no tuple of 2n+1 low-distinguishable traces [57,67] (a safety hyperprop-
erty). We can express that as follows:
¬∃pi0. . . . . ∃pi2n .
(∧
i
pii =L,in pi0
)
∧
∧
i6=j
pii 6=L,out pij (9)
The initial negation can pushed inside to obtained a proper HyperLTL formula.
Quantitative flow and entropy naturally bring to mind probabilistic systems.
We haven’t yet explored extending our logics to enable specification of policies
that involve probabilities. Perhaps techniques previously used with epistemic
logic [28] could be adapted; we leave this as future work.
Event-based systems. Our examples above use a synchronous state-based ex-
ecution model. Many formulations of security policies, including the original
formulation of noninterference [26], instead use an event-based system model, in
which input and output events are not synchronized and have no relation to time.
HyperLTL can express policies for asynchronous execution models, too. For ex-
ample, HyperLTL can express the original definition of noninterference [26] and
observational determinism; Appendix A shows how. The key idea is to allow the
system to stutter and to quantify over all stuttered versions of the executions.
We characterize the correct synchronization of a pair of traces as having up-
dates to low variables only at the same positions. We then add an additional
antecedent to the policy formula to require that only those pairs of traces that
are synchronized correctly need to fulfill the security condition.
4 HyperCTL∗
HyperLTL was derived from LTL by extending the models of formulas from single
traces to sets of traces. However, like LTL, HyperLTL is restricted to linear time
and cannot express branching-time properties (e.g., all states that succeed the
current state satisfy some proposition). We show now that a branching-time
logic for hyperproperties could be derived from a branching-time logic for trace
properties, such as CTL∗ [21]. We call this logic HyperCTL∗. The key idea is
again to use sets instead of singletons as the models of formulas.
Syntax. HyperCTL∗ generalizes HyperLTL by allowing quantifiers to appear
anywhere within a formula. Quantification in HyperCTL∗ is over paths through
a Kripke structure. A path p is an infinite sequence of pairs of a state and a set
of atomic propositions. Hence, a path differs from a trace by including a state
of the Kripke structure in each element. Formally, p ∈ (S × 2AP)ω, where S is
the states of the Kripke structure. As with traces, p[i] denotes the element i of
p, and p[i,∞] denotes the suffix of p beginning with element i. We also define a
new notation: let p(i) be the state in element i of p.
8In HyperCTL∗, pi is a path variable and ∃pi is a path quantifier. Formulas of
HyperCTL∗ are defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= api | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ| Xϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ∃pi. ϕ
We introduce all the syntactic sugar for derived logical operators, as for Hy-
perLTL. The universal quantifier can now be defined as syntactic sugar, too:
∀pi. ϕ ≡ ¬∃pi. ¬ϕ. A HyperCTL∗ formula is closed if all occurrences of some
path variable pi are in the scope of a path quantifier. A HyperCTL∗ specification
is a Boolean combination of closed HyperCTL∗ formulas each beginning with a
quantifier (or its negation).
Semantics. The validity judgment for HyperCTL∗ formulas is written Π |=K ϕ,
where K is a Kripke structure, and Π : V → (S × 2AP)ω is a path assignment,
which is a partial function mapping path variables to paths. We write K as a
subscript on |=, because K propagates unchanged through the semantics; we
omit K when it is clear from context. Validity is defined as follows:
Π |=K api iff a ∈ L
(
Π(pi)(0)
)
Π |=K ¬ϕ iff Π 6|=K ϕ
Π |=K ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff Π |=K ϕ1 or Π |= ϕ2
Π |=K Xϕ iff Π[1,∞] |=K ϕ
Π |=K ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff there exists i ≥ 0 :Π[i,∞] |=K ϕ2
and for all 0 ≤ j < i we have Π[j,∞] |=K ϕ1
Π |=K ∃pi. ϕ iff there exists p ∈ Paths(K,Π(pi
′)(0)) : Π[pi 7→ p] |=K ϕ
In the clause for existential quantification, pi′ denotes the path variable most
recently added to Π (i.e., closest in scope to pi). If Π is empty, let Π(pi′)(0) be the
initial state of K. It would be straightforward but tedious to further formalize
this notation, so we omit the details. That clause uses another new notation,
Paths(K, s), which is the set of paths produced by Kripke structure K beginning
from state s. Formally, Paths(K, s) contains path p, where p = (s0, P0)(s1, P1) . . .
and Pi ∈ 2AP, iff there exists a sequence s0s1 . . . of states, such that s0 is s, and
for all i ≥ 0, it holds that si+1 ∈ δ(si) and Pi = L(si).
Like with Traces in HyperLTL, we define Paths(K, s,AP′) as follows: We
have (s0, P0 ∪ P ′0)(s1, P1 ∪ P
′
1) . . . ∈ Paths(K, s,AP
′) iff (s0, P0)(s1, P1) . . . ∈
Paths(K, s), and for all i ≥ 0, it holds that P ′i ⊆ AP
′ \ AP.
We say that a Kripke structure K satisfies a HyperCTL∗ specification ϕ,
denoted by K |= ϕ, if Π |=K ϕ holds true for the empty assignment. The model
checking problem for HyperCTL∗ is to decide whether a given Kripke structure
satisfies a given HyperCTL∗ specification.
HyperCTL∗ vs. HyperLTL. LTL can be characterized as the fragment of CTL∗
containing formulas of the form Aϕ, where A is the CTL∗ universal path quan-
tifier and ϕ contains no quantifiers. Formula Aϕ is satisfied in CTL∗ by a Kripke
structure iff ϕ is satisfied in LTL by the traces of the Kripke structure.
9A similar relationship holds between HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗: Hyper-
LTL can be characterized as the fragment of HyperCTL∗ containing formulas in
prenex form—that is, a series of quantifiers followed by a quantifier-free formula.
A formula ϕ in prenex form is satisfied in HyperCTL∗ by a Kripke structure iff ϕ
is satisfied in HyperLTL by the traces of the Kripke structure. HyperCTL∗ is a
strict generalization of HyperLTL, which extends HyperLTL with the capability
to use quantified formulas as subformulas in the scope of temporal operators.
For example, consider the program (l := 0 8 l := 0) 8 (l := 1 8 l := 1). A
low-observer can infer which branch of the center-most nondeterministic choice
is taken, but not which branch is taken next. This is expressed by HyperCTL∗
formula ∀pi. X ∀pi′. X(lpi ↔ lpi′). There is no equivalent HyperLTL formula.
As we show in Subsection 5.3, the temporal logic SecLTL [20] can be en-
coded in HyperCTL∗, but not in HyperLTL. This provides further examples
that distinguish HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗.
5 Related Logics
We now examine the expressiveness of HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ compared to
several existing temporal logics: LTL, CTL∗, QPTL, ETL, and SecLTL. There
are many other logics that we could compare to in future work; some of those
are discussed in Section 8.
5.1 Temporal Logics
HyperCTL∗ is an extension of CTL∗ and therefore subsumes LTL, CTL, and
CTL∗. Likewise, HyperLTL subsumes LTL. But temporal logics LTL, CTL, and
CTL∗ cannot express information-flow policies. LTL formulas express properties
of individual execution paths. All of the noninterference properties of Section 3
are properties of sets of execution paths [16, 42]. Explicit path quantification
does enable their formulation in HyperLTL.
Even though CTL and CTL∗ have explicit path quantifiers, information-flow
security policies, such as observational determinism (6), cannot be expressed
with them. Consider the following fragment of CTL∗ semantics:
s |= Aϕ iff for all p ∈ Paths(K, s) : p |= ϕ
p |= Φ iff p(0) |= Φ
Path formulas ϕ are modeled by paths p, and state formulas Φ are modeled
by states s. State formula Aϕ holds at state s when all paths proceeding from
s satisfy ϕ. Any state formula Φ can be treated as a path formula, in which
case Φ holds of the path iff Φ holds in the first state on that path. Using this
semantics, consider the meaning of AAϕ, which is the form of observational
determinism (6):
s |= AAϕ
= for all p ∈ Paths(K, s) : p |= Aϕ
= for all p ∈ Paths(K, s) and p′ ∈ Paths(K, s) : p′ |= ϕ
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Note how the meaning of AAϕ is ultimately determined by the meaning of ϕ,
where ϕ is modeled by the single path p′. Path p is ignored in determining
the meaning of ϕ; the second universal path quantifier causes p to “leave scope.”
Hence ϕ cannot express correlations between p and p′, as observational determin-
ism requires. So CTL∗ path quantifiers do not suffice to express information-flow
policies. Neither do CTL path quantifiers, because CTL is a sub-logic of CTL∗. In
fact, even the modal µ-calculus does not suffice to express some information-flow
properties [2].
By using the self-composition construction [7,58], it is possible to express re-
lational noninterference in CTL [7] and observational determinism in CTL∗ [33].
Those approaches resemble HyperCTL∗, but HyperCTL∗ formulas express poli-
cies directly over the original system, rather than over a self-composed system.
Furthermore, the self-composition approach does not seem capable of expressing
policies that require both universal and existential quantifiers over infinite exe-
cutions, like noninference (5) and generalized noninterference (7). It is straight-
forward to express such policies in our logics.
QPTL. Quantified propositional temporal logic (QPTL) [56] extends LTL with
quantification over propositions, whereas HyperLTL extends LTL with quantifi-
cation over traces. Quantification over traces is more powerful than quantifica-
tion over propositions, as we now show.
QPTL formulas are generated by the following grammar, where a ∈ AP:
ψ ::= a | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | Xψ | Fψ | ∃a. ψ
All QPTL connectives have the same semantics as in LTL, except for proposi-
tional quantification:
p |= ∃a.ψ iff there exists p′ ∈ (2AP)ω : p =AP\a p
′ and p′ |= ψ .
Theorem 1. HyperLTL subsumes QPTL, but QPTL does not subsume Hyper-
LTL.
Proof sketch. To express a QPTL formula in HyperLTL, rewrite the formula to
prenex form, and rename all bound propositions with unique fresh names from
a set AP′. These propositions act as free variables, which are unconstrained
because they do not occur in the Kripke structure. Replace each propositional
quantification ∃a in the QPTL formula by a path quantification ∃pia in the
HyperLTL formula. And replace each occurrence of a by apia . The result is a
HyperLTL formula that holds iff the original QPTL formula holds.
But not all HyperLTL formulas can be expressed in QPTL. For example,
QPTL cannot express properties that require the existence of paths, such as
∃pi.X api.
In Section 6, we exploit the relationship between HyperLTL and QPTL to
obtain a model checking algorithm for HyperLTL.
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5.2 Epistemic Logics
HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ express information-flow policies by explicit quan-
tification over multiple traces or paths. Epistemic temporal logic has also been
used to express such policies [4, 11, 29, 62] by implicit quantification over traces
or paths with the knowledge connective K of epistemic logic [22]. We do not yet
know which is more powerful, particularly for information-flow policies. But we
do know that HyperLTL subsumes a common epistemic temporal logic.
Define ETL (epistemic temporal logic) to be LTL with the addition of K
under its perfect recall semantics [4, 22, 60]. The model of an ETL formula is a
pair (K,Agts) of a Kripke structure K and a set Agts of equivalence relations
on AP, called the agents ; each relation models the knowledge of an agent. (In-
terpreted systems, rather than Kripke structures, are often used to model ETL
formulas [22,60]. Interpreted systems differ in style but can be translated to our
formulation.) In the asynchronous semantics of ETL, KAψ holds on state i of
trace t ∈ Traces(K), denoted t, i |= KAϕ, iff
for all t′ ∈ Traces(K) : t[0, i]≈A t′[0, i] implies t′, i |= ϕ,
where ≈A denotes stutter-equivalence on finite traces with respect to A. In
the synchronous semantics of ETL, stutter-equivalence is replaced by stepwise-
equivalence.
The following two theorems show that HyperLTL subsumes ETL:
Theorem 2. In the synchronous semantics, for every ETL formula ψ and every
set Agts of agents, there exists a HyperLTL formula ϕ such that for all Kripke
structures K, we have (K,Agts) |= ψ iff K |= ϕ.
Theorem 3. In the asynchronous semantics, for every ETL formula ψ and
every set Agts of agents, there exists a HyperLTL formula ϕ such that for all
asynchronous Kripke structures K, we have (K,Agts) |= ψ iff K |= ϕ.
Proofs of both theorems appear in Appendix B. Theorem 3 requires an additional
assumption that K is an asynchronous Kripke structure, i.e. that it can always
stutter in its current state and that it is indicated in an atomic proposition
whether the last state was a stuttering step.
HyperLTL and ETL have the same worst-case complexity for model check-
ing, which is non-elementary. But, as we show in Section 6, the complexity of
our model checking algorithm on the information-flow policies of Section 3 is
much better—only NLOGSPACE (for observational determinism, declassifica-
tion, and quantitative noninterference for a fixed number of bits) or PSPACE
(for noninference and generalized noninterference) in the size of the system. For
those policies in NLOGSPACE, that complexity, unsurprisingly, is as good as
algorithms based on self-composition [7]. This ability to use a general-purpose,
efficient HyperLTL model checking algorithm for information flow seems to be
an improvement over encodings of information flow in ETL.
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5.3 SecLTL
SecLTL [20] extends temporal logic with the hide modality H , which allows to
express information flow properties such as noninterference [26]. The semantics
of SecLTL is defined in terms of labeled transition system, where the edges are
labeled with valuations of the set of variables. The formula HH,Oϕ specifies
that the current valuations of a subset H of the input variables I are kept secret
from an attacker who may observe variables in O until the release condition ϕ
becomes true. The semantics is formalized in terms of a set of alternative paths
to which the main path is compared:
AltPaths(p,H) = {p′ ∈ Paths(KM , p[0]) | p[1]=I\H p
′[1] and p[2,∞]=I p′[2,∞]}
where KM is the equivalent Kripke structure for the labeled transition system
M (we will explain the translation later in this section.) A path p satisfies the
SecLTL formula HH,Oϕ, denoted by p |= HH,Oϕ, iff
∀p′ ∈ AltPaths(p,H).
(
p=O p
′, or there exists i ≥ 0 :
p[i,∞] |=K ϕ and p[1, i−1]=O p′[1, i−1]
)
A labeled transition systemM satisfies a SecLTL formula ψ, denoted byM |= ψ,
if every path p starting in the initial state satisfies ψ.
SecLTL can express properties like the dynamic creation of secrets discussed
in Section 4, which cannot be expressed by HyperLTL. However, SecLTL is
subsumed by HyperCTL∗. To encode the hide modality in HyperCTL∗, we first
translate M into a Kripke structure KM , whose states are labeled with the
valuation of the variables on the edge leading into the state. The initial state is
labeled with the empty set. In the modified system, L(p[1]) corresponds to the
current labels. We encode HH,Oϕ as the following HyperCTL
∗ formula:
∀pi′. pi[1]=I\H pi
′[1] ∧ X
(
pi[1]=O pi
′[1] W (pi[1] 6=I pi
′[1] ∨ ϕ)
)
Theorem 4. For every SecLTL formula ψ and transition system M , there is a
HyperCTL∗ formula ϕ such that M |= ψ iff KM |= ϕ.
The model checking problem for SecLTL is PSPACE-hard in the size of the
Kripke structure [20]. The encoding of SecLTL specifications in HyperCTL∗
implies that the model checking problem for HyperCTL∗ is also PSPACE-hard
(for a fixed specification of alternation depth ≥ 1), as claimed in Theorem 6.
6 Model Checking and Satisfiability
In this section we exploit the connection between HyperCTL∗ and QPTL to
obtain a model checking algorithm for HyperCTL∗ and study its complexity. We
identify a hierarchy of fragments of HyperCTL∗ characterized by the number of
quantifier alternations. This hierarchy allows us to give a precise characterization
of the complexity of the model checking problem. The fragment of formulas with
quantifier alternation depth 0 includes already many formulas of interest and our
result provides an NLOGSPACE algorithm in the size of the Kripke structure.
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Definition 1 (Alternation Depth). A HyperCTL∗ formula ϕ in NNF has
alternation depth 0 plus the highest number of alternations from existential to
universal and universal to existential quantifiers along any of the paths of the
formula’s syntax tree starting in the root. Occurrences of U and R count as an
additional alternation.
Theorem 5. The model checking problem for HyperCTL∗ specifications ϕ with
alternation depth k on a Kripke structure K is complete for NSPACE(gc(k, |ϕ|))
and it is in NSPACE(gc(k − 1, |K|)) for some c > 0.
The function gc(x, y) denotes a tower of exponentials of height x with ar-
gument y: gc(0, y) = y and gc(x, y) = c
g(x−1,y). NSPACE(gc(x, y)) denotes
the class of languages accepted by a Turing machine bounded in space by
O(gc(x, y)). Abusing notation, we define gc(−1, y) = log y and NSPACE(log y) =
NLOGSPACE in y.
Proof. Both directions, the lower bound and the upper bound, are based on the
complexity of the satisfiability problem for QPTL formulas ϕ in prenex normal
form and with alternation depth k, which is complete for NSPACE(g(k, |ϕ|)) [56].
For the upper bound on the HyperCTL∗ model checking complexity, we first
translate until operators ψ U ψ′ as ∃t. t ∧ G(t → ψ′ ∨ (ψ ∧ X t)) ∧ ¬G t. Let
ψ(K,AP′) encode a Kripke structure K, where K = (S, s0, δ,AP, L), as a QPTL
formula (cf. [37]) using the set of atomic propositions AP′, which must contain
atomic propositions replacing those of AP and additional atomic propositions
to describe the states S. The formula ψ(K,AP′) is linear in |K| and does not
require additional quantifiers.
HyperCTL∗ path quantifiers ∃pi.ϕ and ∀pi.ϕ are then encoded as ∃APpi.
ψ(K,APpi) ∧ ϕAPpi and ∀APpi.ψ(K,APpi) → ϕAPpi , where APpi is a set of fresh
atomic propositions including a copy of AP and additional atomic propositions
to describe the states S. The formula ϕAPpi is obtained from ϕ by replacing all
atomic propositions referring to path pi by their copies in APpi. Atomic proposi-
tions in the formula that are not in AP (i.e. their interpretation is not fixed in
K) need to be added to the sets APpi accordingly.
For the lower bound, we reduce the satisfiability problem for a given QPTL
formula ϕ in prenex normal form to a model checking problem K |= ϕ′ of
HyperCTL∗. We assume, without loss of generality, that ϕ is closed (if a free
proposition occurs in ϕ, we bind it with an existential quantifier) and each
quantifier in ϕ introduces a different proposition.
The Kripke structure K consists of two states S = {s0, s1}, is fully con-
nected δ(s) = S for all s ∈ S, and has a single atomic proposition AP = {p}.
The states are labeled as follows: L(s0) = ∅ and L(s1) = {p}. Essentially, paths
in K can encode all sequences of valuations of a variable in QPTL. To obtain
the HyperCTL∗ formula, we now simply replace every quantifier in the QPTL
formula with a path quantifier. The only technical problem left is that quantifi-
cation in QPTL allows to choose freely the value of p in the current state, while
path quantification in HyperCTL∗ only allows the path to differ in the next
state. We solve the issue by shifting the propositions using a next operator.
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Lower bounds in |K|. An NLOGSPACE lower bound in the size of the Kripke
structure for fixed specifications with alternation depth 0 follows from the non-
emptiness problem of non-deterministic Bu¨chi automata. For alternation depth
1 and more we can derive PSPACE hardness in the size of the Kripke structure
from the encoding of the logic SecLTL into HyperCTL∗ (see Subsection 5.3).
The result can easily be transferred to HyperLTL, since in the SecLTL for-
mula that is used to prove PSPACE hardness, the Hide operator does not occur
in the scope of temporal operators and hence the translation yields a HyperLTL
formula.
Theorem 6. For HyperLTL formulas the model checking problem is hard for
PSPACE in the size of the system.
A Remark on Efficiency The use of the standard encoding of the until operator
in QPTL with an additional quantifier shown above is, in certain cases, wasteful.
The satisfiability of QPTL formulas can be checked with an automata-theoretic
construction, where we first transform the formula into prenex normal form, then
generate a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton for the quantifier-free part of the
formula, and finally apply projection and complementation to handle the existen-
tial and universal quantifiers. In this way, each quantifier alternation, including
the alternation introduced by the encoding of the until operators, causes an
exponential blow-up. However, if an until operator occurs in the quantifier-free
part, the standard transformation of LTL formulas to nondeterministic Bu¨chi
automata handle this until operator without requiring a quantifier elimination,
resulting in an exponential speedup.
Using this insight, the model checking complexity for many of the formulas
presented above and in Section 3 can be reduced by one exponent. Additionally,
the complexity with respect to the size of the system reduces to NLOGSPACE for
HyperCTL∗ formulas where the leading quantifiers are all of the same type and
are followed by some quantifier-free formula which may contain until operators
without restriction. Observational determinism and the declassification policy
discussed in Section 3 are examples for specifications in this fragment. This
insight was used for the prototype implementation described in Section 7 and it
avoids an additional complementation step for noninference (5).
Satisfiability. The positive result regarding the model checking problem for
HyperCTL∗ does not carry over to the satisfiability problem. The finite-state
satisfiability problem consists of the existence of a finite model, while the general
satisfiability problem asks for the existence of a possibly infinite model.
Theorem 7. For HyperCTL∗, finite-state satisfiability is hard for Σ01 and gen-
eral satisfiability is hard for Σ11 .
In the proof, located in Appendix C, we reduce the LTL synthesis problem of
distributed systems to the satisfiability problem of HyperCTL∗.
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7 Prototype Model Checker
The results of the previous section yield a model checking algorithm for all of
HyperCTL∗. But most of our information-flow policy examples do not require
the full expressiveness of HyperCTL∗. In fact, we have been able implement a
prototype model checker for an expressive fragment of the logic mostly using
off-the-shelf components.
Define HyperLTL2 as the fragment of HyperLTL (and of HyperCTL
∗) in
which the series of quantifiers at the beginning of a formula may involve at most
one alternation. Every formula in HyperLTL2 thus may begin with at most
two (whence the name) kinds of quantifiers—a sequence of ∀’s followed by a
sequence of ∃’s, or vice-versa. For example, ∃pi.ψ and ∀pi1.∀pi2.∃pi3.ψ are allowed,
but ∀pi1.∃pi2.∀pi3.ψ is not. HyperLTL2 suffices to express all the security policies
formulated in Section 3. (Another logic for hyperproperties, ILkµ [45], similarly
restricts fixpoint operator alternations with no apparent loss in expressivity for
security policies.)
Our model checking algorithm for HyperLTL2, detailed in Appendices D and
E, is based on algorithms for LTL model checking [24, 25, 64]. Those LTL algo-
rithms determine whether a Kripke structure satisfies an LTL formula by per-
forming various automata constructions and by checking language containment.
Our algorithm likewise uses automata constructions and language containment,
as well as self composition [7, 58] and a new projection construction.
We prototyped this algorithm in about 3,000 lines of OCaml code. Our pro-
totype accepts as input a Kripke structure and a HyperLTL2 formula, then con-
structs the automata required by our algorithm, and outputs a countermodel if
the formula does not hold of the structure. For automata complementation, our
prototype outsources to GOAL [59], an interactive tool for manipulating Bu¨chi
automata. We have used the prototype to verify noninference (5), observational
determinism (6), and generalized noninterference (7) for small Kripke structures
(up to 10 states); running times were about 10 seconds or less.
Since our algorithm uses automata complementation, the worst-case running
time is exponential in the size of the Kripke structure’s state space and doubly
exponential in the formula size. So as one might expect, our prototype currently
does not scale to medium-sized Kripke structures (up to 1,000 states). But our
purpose in building this prototype was to demonstrate a proof-of-concept for
model checking of hyperproperties. We conjecture that practical symbolic model
checking algorithms, such as BMC and IC3, could be used to scale up our ap-
proach to real-world systems.
8 Related Work
McLean [42] formalizes security policies as closure with respect to selective inter-
leaving functions. He shows that trace properties cannot express security policies
such as noninterference and average response time, because those are not proper-
ties of single execution traces. Mantel [38] formalizes security policies with basic
security predicates, which stipulate closure conditions for trace sets.
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Clarkson and Schneider [16] introduce hyperproperties, a framework for ex-
pressing security policies. Hyperproperties are sets of trace sets, and are able
to formalize security properties such as noninterference, generalized noninter-
ference, observational determinism and average response time. Clarkson and
Schneider use second-order logic to formulate hyperproperties. That logic isn’t
verifiable, in general, because it cannot be effectively and completely axioma-
tized. Fragments of it, such as HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗, can be verified.
Alur et al. [2] show that modal µ-calculus is insufficient to express all opacity
policies [9], which prohibit observers from discerning the truth of a predicate.
(Alur et al. [2] actually write “secrecy” rather than “opacity.”) Simplifying defi-
nitions slightly, a trace property P is opaque iff for all paths p of a system, there
exists another path p′ of that system, such that p and p′ are low-equivalent, and
exactly one of p and p′ satisfies P . Noninference (5) is an opacity policy [52] that
HyperLTL can express.
Huisman et al. reduce observational-determinism properties to properties
in CTL∗ [33] and in modal µ-calculus [32] on a self-composed system. Barthe
et al. use self composition to verify observational determinism [7] and nonin-
terference [6] on terminating programs. Van der Meyden and Zhang [63] re-
duce a broader class of information-flow policies to safety properties on a self-
composed system expressible in standard linear and branching time logics, and
use model checking to verify noninterference policies. Their methodology re-
quires customized model checking algorithms for each security policy, whereas
this work proposes a single algorithm for all policies.
Balliu et al. [4] use a linear-time temporal epistemic logic to specify many
declassification policies derived from noninterference. Their definition of nonin-
terference, however, seems to be that of observational determinism (6). They do
not consider any information-flow policies involving existential quantification,
such as noninference. They also do not consider systems that accept inputs after
execution has begun. Halpern and O’Neill [29] use a similar temporal epistemic
logic to specify secrecy policies, which subsume many definitions of noninterfer-
ence; they do not pursue model checking algorithms.
Alur et al. [1] discuss branching-time logics with path equivalences that are
also able to express certain security properties. The authors introduce operators
that resemble the knowledge operator of epistemic logics. As the logics build on
branching-time logics they are not subsumed by HyperLTL. The relationship to
HyperCTL∗ is still open.
Milushev and Clarke [44–46] propose three logics for hyperproperties:
– Holistic hyperproperty logic HL, which is based on coinductive predicates
over streams. Holistic hyperproperties “talk about whole traces at once; their
specifications tend to be straightforward, but they are difficult to reason
about, exemplified by the fact that no general approach to verifying such
hyperproperties exists” [44]. HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ are logics that talk
about whole traces at once, too; and they have straightforward specifications
as well as a general approach to verification.
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– Incremental hyperproperty logic IL is a fragment of least fixed-point logic [8].
There is a manual verification methodology for IL [44], but no automated
decision procedure.
– Another incremental hyperproperty logic ILkµ, a fragment of polyadic modal
µ-calculus [3] that permits at most one quantifier alternation (a greatest
fixed-point followed by a least fixed-point). There is an automated model
checking technique [45] for ILkµ based on parity games. That technique has
been prototyped and applied to a few programs.
All these logics suffice to express security policies such as noninterference and
generalized noninterference. Like our logics, the exact expressive limitation is
still an open problem.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the expressiveness of HyperLTL
and HyperCTL∗ versus several other logics is an open question. It’s possible
that some of those logics will turn out to be more expressive or more efficiently
verifiable than HyperLTL or HyperCTL∗. It’s also possible that it will turn
out to be simply a matter of taste which style of logic is more suitable for
hyperproperties. The purpose of this paper was to explore one design option: a
familiar syntax, based on widely-used temporal logics, that can straightforwardly
express well-known hyperproperties.
9 Concluding Remarks
In designing a logic for hyperproperties, starting with HyperLTL was natural,
because hyperproperties are sets of trace sets, and LTL uses trace sets to model
programs. From HyperLTL, the extension to HyperCTL∗ was also natural: we
simply removed the restrictions on where quantifiers could appear. The curtail-
ment to HyperLTL2 was also natural, because it was the fragment needed to
express information-flow security policies. HyperLTL2 permits up to one quanti-
fier alternation, but what about hyperproperties with more? We do not yet know
of any security policies that are examples. As Rogers [49] writes, “The human
mind seems limited in its ability to understand and visualize beyond four or
five alternations of quantifier. Indeed, it can be argued that the inventions. . . of
mathematics are devices for assisting the mind in dealing with one or two addi-
tional alternations of quantifier.” For practical purposes, we might not need to
go much higher than one quantifier alternation.
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A Event-based Execution Model
A.1 Goguen and Meseguer’s noninterference
Noninterference. A point of reference for most of the literature on information
flow is the definition of noninterference that was introduced by Goguen and
Meseguer in 1982 [26]. In this subsection, we show how to express noninterference
in a simple HyperLTL formula.
The system model used in [26], which we will refer to as deterministic state
machines, operates on commands c ∈ C that are issued by different users u ∈ U .
The evolution of a deterministic state machine is governed by the transition
function do : S × U × C → S and there is a separate observation function
out : S × U → Out that for each user indicates what he can observe.
We define standard notions on sequences of users and events. For w ∈
(U × C)∗ and G ⊆ U let |w|G denote the projection of w to the commands
issued by the users in G. Further, we extend the transition function do to se-
quences, do(s, (u, c).w) = do(do(s, u, c), w), where the dot indicates concatena-
tion. Finally, we extend the observation function out to sequences w, indicating
the observation after w: out(w,G) = out(do(s0, w), G). Noninterference is then
defined as a property on systems M . A set of users GH ⊆ U does not interfere
with a second group of users GL ⊆ U , if
∀w ∈ (U × C)∗. out(w,GL) = out(|w|GH , GL)
That is, we ask whether the same output would be produced by the system,
if all actions issued by any user in GH were removed.
Encoding GM’s System Model First, we need to map their system model into
Kripke structures as used for the formulation of HyperCTL∗ (which, obviously,
must not solve problem by itself). We choose an intuitive encoding of state ma-
chines in Kripke structures that indicates in every state (via atomic propositions)
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which observations can be made for the different users, and also which action
was issued last, including the responsible user.
We choose a simple translation that maps a state machineM = (S,U,C,Out ,
out, do, s0) to the Kripke structure K = (S
′, s′0, δ,AP, L), where S
′ = {s0}∪S×
U × C, s′0 = s0, AP = U × C ∪ U × Out, and the labeling function is defined
as L(s0) = {(u, out(s0, u)) | u ∈ U} for the initial state and L((s, u, c)) =
{(u, c)} ∪ {(u′, out(s, u′)) | u′ ∈ U} for all other states.
The transition function is defined as
δ(s, u, c) = {(s′, u′, c′) | do(s, u′, c′) = s′, u′∈ U, c′∈ C}
Each state (except for the initial state) has labels indicating the command
that was issued last, and the user that issued the command. The remaining labels
denote the observations that the individual users can make in this state.
To access these two separate pieces of information, we introduce functions
In : S → U ×C, which is not defined for s0, and out : S×U → Out (by abusing
notation slightly), with their obvious meanings.
In this system model let s =U\GH s
′ mean that if we entered one of the states
s and s′ with a user not in GH the users and commands must be identical. If
both states are entered by users in GH then the commands may be different. The
output equality on states s =O,GL s
′, shall refer to the observations the users
GL can make at this state. Then, noninterference can be expressed as follows:
∀pi.∀pi′. pi[0] =U\GH pi
′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=U\GH pi
′[0] ∧
(
pi[0] ∈ H ∧ G(Xpi[0] =U\GH pi
′[0]) → G(X pi[0] =O,GL pi
′[0])
))
Theorem 8. There is a HyperLTL formula and an encoding K(M) of state
machines into Kripke structures such that for every state machineM , and groups
of users GH and GL it holds K(M) |= ϕNI (GH , GL) iff GH does not interfere
with GL in M .
Proof. The formula pattern pi[0] =U\GH pi
′[0] W
(
pi[0] 6=U\GH pi
′[0] ∧ ϕ
)
implies
that ϕ is applied exactly at the first position at which pi and pi′ differ in their
input (except, possibly, on the input of users in GH). As, for a fixed path pi, we
quantify over all paths pi′ the subformula ϕ is hence applied to every position of
every path pi.
The subformula ϕ then requires that, if from that position on pi’s input differs
from the input of pi′ only in that it has an additional (secret) action by some
user in GH , both paths must look equivalent from the view point of the users in
GL. The interesting part here is the use of the next operator, as it enables the
comparison of different positions of the traces. Thus, we compare path pi to all
other paths that have one secret action less than itself. Hence, by transitivity of
equivalence, we compare all paths pi to a version of itself that is stripped of all
secret actions.
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A.2 Observational determinism
Theorem 9. There is an encoding of programs as defined in [33] into Kripke
structures, such that HyperCTL∗ can express observational determinism.
Proof. Huisman et al. [33] define observational determinism over programs in a
simple while language, which is very similar to the execution model of [68]. First,
they define a special version of self-composition on their programs that allows
both sides to move independently by introduces stuttering steps. Then, they
encode programs into Kripke structures that do not only maintain the current
state, but also remember the last state. The CTL∗ formula is then proved to
precisely express observational determinism. Since HyperCTL∗ subsumes CTL∗,
we can make use of the same encoding of programs into Kripke structures, but
we leave out the self-composition operation on programs. In order to re-enable
the correct synchronization of paths, however, we have to introduce stutter steps
for single, not self-composed that is, programs.
We prepend the CTL∗ formula with two path quantifiers over paths pi1 and
pi2 and we let those propositions of the formula that referred to the two copies
of the program now refer to the two paths, respectively.
A.3 Declassification
Likewise, HyperLTL can also express declassification properties in a program-
ming language setting.
Corollary 1. HyperLTL can express the declassification properties discussed in
[4].
The result follows from the encoding [4] of declassification properties into
epistemic temporal logic [22] and the fact that HyperLTL subsumes epistemic
temporal logic (see Section 5).
B Epistemic Logics
We start with the proof that HyperCTL∗ subsumes epistemic temporal logics
under the assumption of synchronous time. That is, we assume the Kripke struc-
ture to have an atomic proposition that does nothing but switching its value in
every step and that is observable by every agent. By this, the stutter-equivalent
comparison collapses to a step-wise comparison.
Theorem 10. Under synchronous time semantics, for every epistemic temporal
logic formula ψ and every set of agents Agts, there is a HyperLTL formula ϕ
such that for all Kripke structures K it holds (K,Agts) |= ψ iff K |= ϕ.
Proof. We start by considering the extension of HyperLTL with the knowledge
operator with the semantics above. We prepend a universal path quantifier to
the formula ψ and apply a stepwise transformation to eliminate all knowledge
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operators. (Note that the semantics relations pi, i |= ψ of linear time epistemic
logics and and Π |=K ϕ of HyperCTL
∗ have different parameters, but it is plain
how to join them into a single relation Π, i |=K ϕ.)
Let ϕ be a HyperLTL formula in NNF that possibly has knowledge operators.
For brevity, we summarize the leading quantifiers of ϕ with Q, such that ϕ =
Q.ϕ′ where ϕ′ is quantifier-free. Let t and u be propositions that ϕ does not refer
to and that are not in the alphabet of the Kripke structure. In case a knowledge
operator KAψ
′ occurs in ϕ′ with positive polarity, translate ϕ into the following
HyperLTL formula:
Q.∃pi. ∀pi′. ∀pi′′. ϕ′|KAψ′→upi ∧
(
(tpi′ UG¬tpi′) →
G(tpi′ → (pi∗[0]=Api′′[0])) → G(tpi′ ∧ upi → [ψ′]pi′′)
)
and, if the knowledge operator occurs negatively,
Q.∃pi. ∀pi′. ∃pi′′. ϕ′|¬KAψ′→upi ∧
(
(tpi′ UG¬tpi′)→
G(tpi′ → (pi∗[0]=Api′′[0])) ∧ F(tpi′∧ upi ∧ ¬[ψ′]pi′′)
)
where ϕ′|KPψ→upi denotes that in ϕ
′ one positive or one negative occurrence,
respectively, of the knowledge operator KPψ is replaced by proposition u, and
where pi∗ is the path on which the knowledge operator that we currently eliminate
was applied on (which could be a different path to the first one, in case of
nested knowledge operators). We repeat this transformation until no knowledge
operators remain.
Paths pi and pi′ are only used to carry the information about proposition u and
t, respectively. That is, we use these paths to quantify over a sequence of atomic
propositions, the same way the QPTL quantification works. The sequence of the
atomic proposition u indicates at which positions of a given trace the knowledge
operator needs to be evaluated. There can be multiple such sequences (e.g. for
a formula F(KAϕ
′′)) that would make the formula satisfied, so the sequence is
existentially quantified (∃pi). We need to fix one particular of these sequences of
applications of the knowledge operator in advance, because we cannot go back
in time to the initial state where the quantification knowledge operator happens.
The sequence of atomic propositions t is restricted to be true initially until
it is globally false. In this way, we select a point in time until which the paths
pin and pi
′′ are required to be equal w.r.t. the observations of agent A (G(tpi′ →
(pin[0] =A pi
′′[0]))). At this selected point in time, if also the knowledge operator
is required to hold (indicated by u) we need to check that the subformula ψ′
of the knowledge operator is checked on the alternative path. We relaxed this
condition to simplify the formula. Instead of the point in the sequence where t
switches from true to false, we apply subformula ψ′ on all positions before the
that point (G(tpi′ ∧ upi → [ψ′]pi′′)). Since the sequences of t are all-quantified,
this does not affect the meaning of the formula.
Note that using past operator would simplify the encoding substantially,
since we could more easily refer to the initial state where all paths in epistemic
temporal logics branch.
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We now discuss the adaptations necessary to extend the encoding from the
proof of Theorem 10 to non-synchronous systems. For asynchronous systems
it is natural to assume that they may stutter in their current state. In this
discussion, we also assume that it is visible whether an asynchronous system has
last performed a stuttering step, or whether it performed an action. (It may also
be possible for a Kripke structure to perform an action that stays in a state.) We
call a Kripke structure with these properties an asynchronous Kripke structure.
The following proof of Theorem 3 is also a good example for the general
treatment of asynchronous executions in HyperCTL∗.
Theorem 11. For every epistemic temporal logic formula ψ and every set of
agents Agts, there is a HyperLTL formula ϕ such that for all asynchronous
Kripke structures K it holds (K,Agts) |= ψ iff K |= ϕ.
Proof. We assume that the atomic proposition stutter describes that no action
was performed in the last step.
Since there always is the option to stutter in a stat, the number of paths we
quantify over is larger. The idea of the proof is to restrict this enlarged set of
paths to those that do not stutter forever (progress(pi) = GF¬stutterpi) and that
synchronize correctly
(
synch(pi, pi′) = G
(
pi[0] 6=P Xpi[0] ⇔ pi′[0] 6=P X pi′[0]
))
.
By requiring the correct synchronization, we choose an alignment where changes
in the observations happen in both paths at the same points in the sequences.
That is, the remaining positions must be filled with stuttering steps.
The encoding from the proof of Theorem 10 is now modified as follows for
positively occurring knowledge operators:
Q.∃pi. ϕ′|KAψ′→upi ∧
(
∀pi′. (tpi′ UG¬tpi′) →
∀pi′′. progress(pi′′) ∧ synch(pi, pi′′) ∧
G(tpi′ → (pi∗[0]=Api′′[0])) → G(tpi′ ∧ upi → [ψ′]pi′′)
)
and, for negatively occurring knowledge operators:
Q.∃pi. ϕ′|KAψ′→upi ∧
(
∀pi′. (tpi′ UG¬tpi′)→
∃pi′′. progress(pi′′) ∧ synch(pi, pi′′) ∧
G(tpi′ → (pi∗[0]=Api′′[0])) ∧ F(tpi′∧ upi ∧ ¬[ψ′]pi′′)
)
For a positively occurring knowledge operator KAψ′, we prove that given two
executions pi1 and pi2, if the sub-formula ψ
′ must hold on pi2 at some position i
(by the semantics of the knowledge operator), then the formula above requires
that on a stuttered version of pi1 the sub-formula is applied at state pi2[i]. We
consider the prefixes of the two executions, pi1[0, i] and pi2[0, j] and assume they
have the same traces with respect to agent A. For these, there are two stuttered
versions pi and pi′′ (named to match the path variables in the formula above) that
synchronize the positions at which they change their observations with respect
to A and pad the prefixes to the same length k (without changing their final
states, that is pi2[i] = pi
′′[k]). There is also a labeling with tpi′ that ensures that
the knowledge operator is evaluated until position k. Hence, ψ′ is applied on pi′′
at state pi2[i].
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The other direction is straightforward, and the case of a negatively occurring
knowledge operator follows similarly. The quantifiers do not occur inside the
scope of temporal operators, and can thus easily be pulled to the front of the
formula, resulting in a HyperLTL formula.
C Satisfiability
Theorem 12. For HyperCTL∗, finite-state satisfiability is hard for Σ01 and gen-
eral satisfiability is hard for Σ11 .
Proof. We give a reduction from the synthesis problem for LTL specifications in
a distributed architecture consisting of two processes with disjoint sets of vari-
ables. The synthesis problem consists on deciding whether there exist transition
systems for the two processes with input variables I1 and I2, respectively, and
output variables O1 and O2, respectively, such that the synchronous product
of the two transition systems satisfies a given LTL formula ϕ. This problem is
hard for Σ01 if the transition systems are required to be finite, and hard for Σ
1
1
if infinite transition systems are allowed (Theorems 5.1.8 and 5.1.11 in [51]).
To reduce the synthesis problem to HyperCTL∗ satisfiability, we construct
a HyperCTL∗ formula ψ as a conjunction ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ ψ3. The first con-
junct ensures that ϕ holds on all paths: ψ1 = ∀pi.[ϕ]pi , where [ϕ]pi indicates
that the atomic propositions in ϕ get the index pi. The second conjunct en-
sures that every state of the model has a successor for every possible input:
∀pi.G
∧
I⊆I1∪I2
∃pi′X
∧
i∈I i
∧
i6∈I ¬i. The third conjunct ensures that the out-
put in O1 does not depend on I2 and the output in O2 does not depend on I1:
ψ3 = ∀pi.∀pi′.
(
pi=I1 pi
′ → pi=O1 pi
′
)
∧
(
pi=I2 pi
′ → pi=O2 pi
′
)
.
The distributed synthesis problem has a (finite) solution iff the HyperCTL∗
formula ψ has a (finite) model.
D Model-checking Constructions for HyperLTL
2
D.1 Self-composition construction
Self-composition is the technique that Barthe et al. [7] adopt to verify non-
interference policies. It was generalized by Terauchi and Aiken [58] to verify
observational determinism policies [36, 68], and by Clarkson and Schneider [16]
to verify k-safety hyperproperties. We extend this technique to model-checking
of HyperLTL2.
Bu¨chi automata. Bu¨chi automata [65] are finite-state automata that accept
strings of infinite length. A Bu¨chi automaton is a tuple (Σ,S,∆, S0, F ) where
Σ is an alphabet, S is the set of states, ∆ is the transition relation such that
∆ ⊆ S × Σ × S, S0 is the set of initial states, and F is the set of accepting
states, where both S0 ⊆ S and F ⊆ S. A string is a sequence of letters in Σ.
A path s0s1 . . . of a Bu¨chi automaton is over a string α1α2 . . . if, for all i ≥ 0,
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it holds that (si, αi+1, si+1) ∈ ∆. A string is recognized by a Bu¨chi automaton
if there exists a path pi over the string with some accepting states occurring
infinitely often, in which case pi is an accepting path. The language L(A) of an
automaton A is the set of strings that automaton accepts. A Bu¨chi automaton
can be derived [14] from a Kripke structure, which is a common mathematical
model of interactive, state-based systems.
Self composition. The n-fold self-composition An of Bu¨chi automaton A is es-
sentially the product of A with itself, n times. This construction is defined as
follows:
Definition 2. Bu¨chi automaton An is the n-fold self-composition of Bu¨chi au-
tomaton A, where A = (Σ,S,∆, S0, F ), if A
n = (Σn, Sn, ∆′, Sn0 , F
n) and for all
s1, s2 ∈ Sn and α ∈ Σn we have (s1, α, s2) ∈ ∆′ iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds
that (prj i(s), prj i(α), prj i(s
′)) ∈ ∆.
Let zip denote the usual function that maps an n-tuple of sequences to a single
sequence of n-tuples—for example, zip([1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6]) = [(1, 4), (2, 5), (3, 6)]—
and let unzip denote its inverse. An recognizes zip(pi1, . . . , pin) if A recognizes
each of pi1, . . . , pin:
Proposition 1. L(An) = {zip(pi1, . . . , pin) | pi1, . . . , pin ∈ L(A)}
Proof. By the construction of An.
D.2 Formula-to-automaton construction
Given a HyperLTL2 formula ∀pi1 . . . ∀pik∃pik+1 . . .∃pik+jψ, we now show how to
construct an automaton that accepts exactly the strings w for which unzip(w) |=∅
ψ. Our construction extends standard methodologies for LTL automata construc-
tion [24, 25, 64].
1. Negation normal form. We begin by preprocessing ψ to put it in a form
more amenable to model checking. The formula is rewritten to be in negation
normal form (NNF), meaning (i) negation connectives are applied only to atomic
propositions in ψ, (ii) the only connectives used in ψ are X, U, R, ¬, ∨ and ∧.
We identify ¬¬ψ with ψ.
2. Construction. We now construct a generalized Bu¨chi automaton [19] Aψ for
ψ. A generalized Bu¨chi automaton is the same as a Bu¨chi automaton except that
it has multiple sets of accepting states. That is, a generalized Bu¨chi automaton is
a tuple (Σ,S,∆, S0, F ) where Σ, S, ∆ and S0 are defined as for Bu¨chi automata,
and F = {Fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and Fi ⊆ S}. Each of the Fi is an accepting set. A
string is recognized by a generalized Bu¨chi automaton if there is a path over the
string with at least one of the states in every accepting set occurring infinitely
often.
To construct the states of Aψ , we need some additional definitions. Define
closure cl(ψ) of ψ to be the least set of subformulas of ψ that is closed under
the following rules:
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– if ψ′ ∈ cl(ψ), then ¬ψ′ ∈ cl(ψ).
– if ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ) or ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆ cl(ψ).
– if Xψ′ ∈ cl(ψ), then ψ′ ∈ cl(ψ).
– if ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ) or ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆ cl(ψ).
And define Mcs to be a maximal consistent set with respect to cl(ψ) if Mcs ⊆
cl(ψ) and the following conditions hold:
– ψ′ ∈Mcs iff ¬ψ′ 6∈Mcs.
– if ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈Mcs iff {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆Mcs).
– if ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then (ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈Mcs iff ψ1 ∈Mcs or ψ2 ∈Mcs).
– if ψ1 U ψ2 ∈Mcs then ψ1 ∈Mcs or ψ2 ∈Mcs.
– if ψ1 R ψ2 ∈Mcs then ψ2 ∈Mcs.
Define ms(ψ) to be the set of all maximal consistent sets with respect to ψ. The
elements of ms(ψ) will be the states of Aψ; hence each state is a set of formulas.
Intuitively, a state s describes a set of trace tuples where each tuple satisfies all
the formulas in s. There will be a transition from a state s1 to a state s2 iff every
trace tuple described by s2 is an immediate suffix of some tuple described by s1.
(Tuple Π is an immediate suffix of Π′ iff Π = Π′[1,∞].)
Automaton Aψ = (Σψ, Sψ, ∆ψ , {ιψ}, Fψ) is defined as follows:
– The alphabet Σψ is P(AP)
n where AP is the set of atomic propositions. Each
letter of the alphabet is, therefore, an n-tuple of sets of atomic propositions.
– The set Sψ of states is ms(ψ) ∪ {ιψ}, where ms(ψ) is defined above and ιψ
is a distinct initial state.
– The transition relation ∆ψ contains (s1, α, s2), where {s1, s2} ⊆ Sψ \ {ιψ}
and α ∈ Σψ, iff
• If apii ∈ s2 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then a ∈ prj i(α). Likewise, if ¬apii ∈ s2,
then a 6∈ prj i(α).
• If Xψ′ ∈ s1 then ψ′ ∈ s2.
• If ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ s1 and ψ2 6∈ s1 then ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ s2.
• If ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ s1 and ¬ψ1 ∈ s1 then ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ s2.
And ∆ψ contains (ιψ , α, s2) iff ψ ∈ s2 and (ιψ , α, s2) is a transition permitted
by the above rules for atomic propositions and their negations.
– The set of initial states contains only ιψ.
– The set Fψ of sets of accepting states contains one set {s ∈ (Sψ\{ιψ}) | ¬(ψ1U
ψ2) ∈ s or ψ2 ∈ s} for each until formula ψ1 U ψ2 in cl(ψ).
The definition of Fψ guarantees that, for every until formula ψ1Uψ2, eventually
ψ2 will hold. That is because the transition rules do not allow a transition from
a state containing ψ1 Uψ2 to a state containing ¬(ψ1 Uψ2) unless ψ2 is already
satisfied.
3. Degeneralization of Bu¨chi automata. Finally, convert generalized Bu¨chi au-
tomaton Aψ to a “plain” Bu¨chi automaton. This conversion is entirely stan-
dard [25], so we do not repeat it here.
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Correctness of the construction. Again without loss of generality, assume that
the names of the traces are natural numbers; then Π is isomorphic to an n-tuple
of traces. Henceforth, we treat Π as that tuple. The following proposition states
that Aψ is constructed such that it recognizes computation tuples that model
ψ:
Proposition 2. Π |=∅ ψ iff zip(Π) ∈ L(Aψ).
Proof. (⇐) By the construction of Aψ, the states with a transition from ιψ
contain ψ. Hence by Lemma 1 below, for all the strings w such that w = zip(Π)
in L(Aψ), it holds that Π |=∅ ψ.
(⇒) Let si = {ψ
′ ∈ cl(ψ) | Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ
′} for all i ≥ 0. Then by the
definition, si ∈ ms(ψ). We show that ιψs0s1 . . . is an accepting path in Aψ. By
Π |=∅ ψ we have ψ ∈ s0. By the construction of Aψ , (iψ, α0, s0) ∈ ∆ψ where
α0 = zip(Π)[0]. The construction of the path inductively follows the construction
of Aψ, which respects the semantics of HyperLTL.
Lemma 1. Let ιψs0 . . . be an accepting path in Aψ over the string w = α0α1 . . . .
Let Π = unzip(w). Then for all i ≥ 0, it holds that ψ′ ∈ si iff Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ
′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ψ′:
Base cases:
1. ψ′ = apir
(⇒) Assume that apir ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ , if apir ∈ si then
a ∈ prj r(αi) or equivalently p ∈ prj r(Π)[i]. By the semantics of HyperLTL,
we have Π[i,∞] |=∅ apir .
(⇐) Assume that Π[i,∞] |=∅ apir . Then a ∈ prj r(Π)[i], which is equivalent
to a ∈ prj r(αi). By the fact that states are maximal consistent sets, one of
apir or ¬apir must appear in si. By the construction of Aψ and the fact that
a ∈ prj r(αi), we have apir ∈ si.
Inductive cases:
1. ψ′ = ¬ψ′′
(⇒) Assume that ¬ψ′′ ∈ si, Then ψ′′ 6∈ si. By induction hypothesis, Π[i,∞] 6|=∅
ψ′′, or equivalently, Π[i,∞] |=∅ ¬ψ
′′. Hence, Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ
′.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒.
2. ψ′ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2
(⇒) By the construction of Aψ, if ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ si then ψ1 ∈ si or ψ2 ∈ si.
By induction hypothesis, Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ1 or Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ2, which concludes
Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒.
3. ψ′ = Xψ′′
(⇒) Assume that ψ′ ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ , ψ′′ ∈ si+1. By induc-
tion hypothesis, Π[i+ 1,∞] |=∅ ψ
′′, which concludes Π[i,∞] |=∅ Xψ
′′.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒ and the fact that always one of Xψ′′ or ¬Xψ′′ appears
in a state.
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4. ψ′ = ψ1 U ψ2
(⇒) Assume that ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ and the fact
that the path is accepting, there is some j ≥ i such that ψ2 ∈ sj . Let
j be the smallest index. By induction hypothesis, Π[i,∞] |=∅ ψ2. By the
construction of Aψ, for all i ≤ k < j, ψ1 ∈ sk. Therefore by induction
hypothesis, Π[k,∞] |=∅ ψ1. which concludes Π[k,∞] |=∅ ψ1 U ψ2.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒.
E Prototype Model Checker for HyperLTL
2
The model-checking procedure for LTL works as follows:
1. Transform Kripke structure K into its corresponding Bu¨chi automaton [10],
AK . This construction is standard [14]. The language of AK is Traces(K).
2. Construct Bu¨chi automaton A¬φ, whose language is the set of all traces that
do not satisfy φ.
3. Intersect AK and A¬φ, yielding automaton AK ∩A¬φ. Its language contains
all traces in Traces(K) that do not satisfy φ. This construction is stan-
dard [14].
4. Check whether the language of AK∩A¬φ is empty. If so, all traces Traces(K)
satisfy φ, hence we say K satisfies φ. If not, then any element of the language
is a counterexample showing that K doesn’t satisfy φ.
Our algorithm for model-checking HyperLTL2 adapts that LTL algorithm.
Without loss of generality, assume that the HyperLTL2 formula to be verified
has the form ∀pi1..k∃pi′1..jψ, where ∀pi1..k means ∀pi1 . . .∀pik, and ∃pi
′
1..j means
∃pi′1 . . .∃pi
′
j . (Formulas of the form ∃pi1..k∀pi
′
1..jψ can be verified by rewriting them
as ∀pi1..k∃pi′1..j¬ψ.) Let n equal k + j. Semantically, a model Π of ψ must be a
set of named traces, where |Π| = n. To determine whether a Kripke structure K
satisfies HyperLTL2 formula ∀pi1..k∃pi
′
1..jψ, our algorithm follows the same basic
steps as the LTL algorithm:
1. Represent K as a Bu¨chi automaton, AK . Construct the n-fold product of
AK with itself—that is, AK ×AK × · · · ×AK , where “AK” occurs n times.
This construction is straightforward and formalized in Appendix D. Denote
the resulting automaton as AnK . If pi1, . . . pin are all traces of Traces(K), then
zip(pi1, . . . pin) is a word in the language of A
n
K .
2. Construct Bu¨chi automaton Aψ . Its language is the set of all words w such
that unzip(w) = Π and Π |=∅ ψ—that is, the tuples Π of traces that satisfy ψ.
This construction is a generalization of the corresponding LTL construction.
It is formalized in Appendix D.
3. Intersect AnK and Aψ , yielding automaton A
n
K ∩ Aψ. Its language is essen-
tially the tuples of traces in Traces(K) that satisfy ψ.
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4. Check whether L(((AnK ∩ Aψ)|k)
C ∩ AkK) is empty, where (i) A
C denotes
the complement of an automaton A, (complement constructions are well-
known—e.g., [64]—so we do not formalize one here), and (ii) A|k denotes
the same automaton as A, but with every transition label (which is an n-
tuple of propositions) projected to only its first k elements. That is, if L(A)
contains words of the form zip(pi1, . . . pin), then L(A|k) contains words of the
form zip(pi1, . . . pik). Projection erases the final j traces from each letter of
a word, leaving only the initial k traces. Thus a word is in the projected
language iff there exists some extension of the word in the original language.
If L(((AnK ∩ Aψ)|k)
C ∩ AkK) is empty, then it holds that
∅ |=Traces(K) ∀pi1..k∃pi
′
1..jψ.
If not, then any element of the language is a counterexample showing that
∅ 6|=Traces(K) ∀pi1..k∃pi
′
1..jψ.
The final step of the above algorithm is a significant departure from the
LTL algorithm. Intuitively, it works because projection introduces an existential
quantifier, thus enabling verification of formulas with a quantifier alternation.
The following theorem states the correctness of our algorithm:
Theorem 13. Let φ be HyperLTL2 formula ∀pi1..k∃pi
′
1..jψ, and let n = k + j.
Let K be a Kripke structure. Then φ holds of K iff L(((AnK ∩ Aψ)|k)
C ∩ AkK) is
empty.
Proof. (⇒, by contrapositive)We seek a countermodel showing that ∀pi1..k∃pi′1..jψ
doesn’t hold of K. For that countermodel to exist,
there must exist a k-tuple Πk : for all j-tuples Πj :
if set(Πk · Πj) ⊆ Traces(K) then Πk ·Πj |=∅ ¬ψ,
(10)
where set(Π) denotes the set containing the same elements as tuple Π. To find
that countermodel Πk, consider L(AnK ∩ Aψ). If that language is empty, then
for all k-tuples Πk and for all j-tuples Πj :
if set(Πk · Πj) ⊆ Traces(K) then Πk ·Πj |=∅ ¬ψ.
(11)
That’s almost what we want, except that Πk is universally quantified in (11)
rather than existentially quantified as in (10). So we introduce projection and
complementation to relax the universal quantification to existential. First, note
that language L((AnK ∩ Aψ)|k) contains all zip(Πk) for which there exists a Πj
such that set(Πk ·Πj) ⊆ Traces(K) and Πk ·Πj |=∅ ψ. So if there exists a Π
∗
k such
that zip(Π∗k) 6∈ L((A
n
K ∩Aψ)|k), then for all Πj , if set(Πk ·Πj) ⊆ Traces(K) then
Πk · Πj |= ¬ψ. That Π∗k would be exactly the countermodel we seek according
to (10). To find such a Π∗k, it suffices to determine whether L((A
n
K ∩ Aψ)|k) ⊂
L(AkK), because any element that strictly separates those sets would satisfy the
requirements to be a Π∗k. By simple set theory, X ⊂ Y iff X
C ∩ Y is not empty.
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Therefore, if L(((AnK ∩ Aψ)|k)
C ∩ AkK) is not empty, then a countermodel Π
∗
k
exists.
(⇐) The same argument suffices: if L(((AnK ∩ Aψ)|k)
C ∩ AkK) is empty, then
no countermodel can exist.
Formulas without quantifier alternation. Define HyperLTL1 to be the frag-
ment of HyperLTL2 that contains formulas with no alternation of quantifiers.
HyperLTL1 can be verified more efficiently than HyperLTL2. To verify ∀pi1..nψ,
it suffices to check whether AnM ∩A¬ψ is non-empty. This is essentially the self-
composition construction, as used in previous work [7, 16, 58].
Complexity. The most expensive computation in model checking HyperLTL2 is
the Bu¨chi automaton complementation. Safra’s construction [55], which can be
used to implement complementation, has complexity of 2O(m logm), where m is
the number of the states of the original automaton. In step 4 of our algorithm,
the automaton being complemented has O(|K|n · 2O(|ψ|)) states, where |K| is
the number of states of K, and |ψ| is the length of ψ. Combined with the fi-
nal intersection and non-emptiness check, the complexity of model checking is
O
(
|K|n · 2O(|K|
n+1·O(|ψ|)·2O(|ψ|))
)
. Our prototype is therefore exponential in the
size of the program (i.e., Kripke structure) and doubly exponential in the size
of the formula. That complexity is worse than the complexity of model-checking
LTL, which is polynomial in the size of the program and exponential in the size
of the formula [64]. Perhaps the complexity of model-checking HyperLTL2 could
be reduced in future work, or perhaps it’s simply the price we pay to have a
general-purpose logic of hyperproperties.
The worst case time complexity of epistemic logic with perfect recall is sim-
ilar to HyperLTL2, as it is exponential to the size of the system, and doubly
exponential in the size of the formula [17]. The worst-case space complexity of
single-quantifier-alternation HyperLTL formulas (i.e., many of the security poli-
cies of interest) is NLOGSPACE, whereas epistemic with perfect recall is worse:
PSPACE-hard [61]. So there is hardly any theoretical advantage of epistemic
over HyperLTL.
